# Vaultfire V3 immutable review downloads

These files are read-only fallbacks for the exact public source release. They do
not deploy, activate, authorize, sign, pay, settle, or publish a V3 service.
Vaultfire V2 remains live/default. Vaultfire protocol V3 and V3 x402 remain
undeployed, unactivated, and fail-closed.

## Exact identities

| Object | Required identity |
| --- | --- |
| Annotated tag | `v3-source-2026-08-27` |
| Tag object | `d9757c125d547968f80d4c61bea08f6638b33dd6` |
| Peeled commit | `bf4b97f65b7032c778d137bb52a432afc4615b51` |
| Source tree | `a1fd90c26ae676c87a10e7d3e614e84961b2990c` |
| Attestation commit | `77ce6a7f7c7c18484353e0a1f41df46777f5fc5e` |
| Attestation tree | `1b3a3c5dd0965b63f7011978242f086e24ab2f8c` |

## Verify the downloads

Download this directory's files without renaming them, then run:

```bash
sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS
git init --bare vaultfire-v3-bundle-verify.git
git -C vaultfire-v3-bundle-verify.git bundle verify \
  ../vaultfire-v3-source-2026-08-27.bundle
rm -rf vaultfire-v3-bundle-verify.git
```

Checksums prove byte integrity against this manifest. They are not an owner
signature. The annotated source tag and attestation commit are unsigned, and
the owner delegation remains `awaiting_owner_signature`.

## Exact tagged Git bundle

```bash
git clone vaultfire-v3-source-2026-08-27.bundle vaultfire-v3-review
cd vaultfire-v3-review
git switch --detach v3-source-2026-08-27
test "$(git rev-parse refs/tags/v3-source-2026-08-27)" = \
  "d9757c125d547968f80d4c61bea08f6638b33dd6"
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = \
  "bf4b97f65b7032c778d137bb52a432afc4615b51"
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD^{tree})" = \
  "a1fd90c26ae676c87a10e7d3e614e84961b2990c"
```

The Git bundle preserves the annotated tag and superproject history. It does
not embed the two independent submodule repositories. Use the expanded archive
when GitHub access for those pinned dependencies is unavailable.

## Checksummed partner-review tooling

`vaultfire-v3-review-tooling.tar.gz` contains `partner-review.sh`, the portable
expanded-archive verifier, the complete expanded-archive file manifest, and an
internal checksum manifest. Verify the top-level `SHA256SUMS`, extract the
tooling archive, then verify its internal manifest:

```bash
sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS
mkdir vaultfire-v3-review-tooling
tar -xzf vaultfire-v3-review-tooling.tar.gz \
  --strip-components=1 \
  -C vaultfire-v3-review-tooling
(cd vaultfire-v3-review-tooling && sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS)
```

See `PARTNER_REVIEW_TOOLING.md` for installation into an exact public checkout,
the clean-worktree boundary, durable result paths, and optional heavyweight
gates.

## Published partner-review evidence

The complete read-only review of post-tag tooling commit
`b40d8f60a4b58c32e50912307bf52107ab45cb80`, with website baseline
`6325dc777d4a7e4fb1e8003f3cb7ba46cf989b25`, is published as:

- `partner-review-result-b40d8f6.json`: machine-readable result.
- `vaultfire-v3-partner-review-evidence-b40d8f6.tar.gz`: exact retained logs,
  human summary, machine result and an internal SHA-256 manifest.
- `PARTNER_REVIEW_EVIDENCE.md`: scope, observed results and verification
  commands.

The core run passed, including 136/136 PR7 tests, 68/68 SDK tests and 10/10
sandbox tests. Current operational readiness remained blocked as required.
Forge/Base heavyweight, native Solana/SBF, local-validator and fork gates were
not run and are recorded separately as unrun.

## Expanded source archive

`vaultfire-v3-source-2026-08-27-expanded.tar.xz` contains the exact tagged
superproject working tree plus expanded `forge-std` and
`openzeppelin-contracts` submodule contents at the commits pinned by the tag.
It intentionally excludes all `.git` directories and cannot move with a
branch.

```bash
python3 verify-v3-expanded.py \
  vaultfire-v3-source-2026-08-27-expanded.tar.xz \
  --manifest vaultfire-v3-source-2026-08-27-expanded.files.sha256
```

The portable verifier checks the pinned outer archive hash, rejects unsafe
archive members, verifies the complete extracted file set and every file hash,
then runs the three content-only V2/V3 byte-manifest checks. It explicitly
reports that Git provenance is not verified in archive mode. Use the Git bundle
and `partner-review.sh` for the complete identity workflow.

## Attestation bundle

```bash
mkdir vaultfire-v3-attestations
tar -xzf vaultfire-v3-attestations-2026-08-27.tar.gz \
  -C vaultfire-v3-attestations
cd vaultfire-v3-attestations
sha256sum --check SHA256SUMS
```

This content bundle is extracted from attestation commit
`77ce6a7f7c7c18484353e0a1f41df46777f5fc5e`, tree
`1b3a3c5dd0965b63f7011978242f086e24ab2f8c`. The AI-assisted source audit is
not an independent human audit. Its conformance record keeps `audited`,
`authorized`, `deployed`, and `endorsed` false.

## No-wallet sandbox

`vaultfire-v3-partner-sandbox.tar.gz` is post-tag review tooling. It is not part
of the frozen candidate. It binds only to loopback, uses deterministic
fixtures, contains no RPC or wallet integration, and cannot broadcast.

```bash
tar -xzf vaultfire-v3-partner-sandbox.tar.gz
cd vaultfire-v3-partner-sandbox
npm ci --offline --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund
npm run build
npm test
npm run reset
npm start
```

See `PARTNER_SANDBOX_README.md` and `SDK_ONBOARDING.md` in this directory.

## Custom certificate authorities

GitLawb remains the canonical public source. On a managed network, first
install the organization's CA certificate in the operating-system trust store
and configure Node/npm to use that trust bundle:

```bash
export NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/absolute/path/to/organization-ca.pem
npm config set cafile /absolute/path/to/organization-ca.pem
export GIT_SSL_CAINFO=/absolute/path/to/organization-ca.pem
```

Do not disable TLS verification. If the Rust GitLawb helper still rejects a
managed proxy certificate, use the checked bundle or expanded archive and
verify `SHA256SUMS`. No standard HTTPS smart-Git URL is advertised here because
one has not been independently verified for this repository.